Obviously a piece of wartime propaganda but isn't it time that we took a serious look
at the "Bader myth"?
Frankly, I haven't much time for Bader. (And before anyone says anything along the lines
of "But you can't understand what he had to go through." I have to state that I
am also an amputee. Please read some of my comments with that in mind.)
I've never been a fighter pilot, though I have held a PPL. (OTOH, the instructor did say
that he felt safer with me at 100 mph in a car; he was right.) However, my study of
history suggests that WW2 marked a turning point in fighter aviation - from the
barnstorming, independent amateur to the disciplined technocrat. In my opinion, Bader
never made the transition. He was lucky on two counts: he was the only man with sufficient
seniority at the time when he got command and he was even more lucky in having
Leigh-Mallory as a patron. My theory is that he was mentally unsuited to the role of
fighter pilot, even by the standards of 1940.
In 1940, a fighter pilot was one element in a complex system. He had to be able to take
orders, follow instructions, up until the point that an interception was made. Bader never
mastered this. He was always lacking in discipline - witness his 1931 crash which was the
result of a remark by a fellow pilot about the Bulldog's handling characteristics. A GOOD
pilot would have recognised the truth - the Bulldog was not a good aircraft.
Bader was prone to elementary mistakes. E.g. on 40.03.31 when he crashed Spitfire K9858 on
takeoff because he forgot to put the propeller in fine pitch. Cockpit drills are supposed
to prevent such errors - which are all too likely in the heat of the moment - but Bader
could never be bothered with such things.
On 40.06.13, landing at night and in rain, he completely misjudged the flarepath and wrote
off another aircraft in in conditions where a less arrogant pilot would have called a
missed approach. [OK, conjecture; Iwasn't there.]
Much of the evidence surrounding the Bader Myth is contradictory. Brickhill (Reach for the
Sky) has Bader assiduously following Air Ministry doctrine; Burns (Bader: the man and his
men) has him challenging such idiocies as "Fighter Attack Number N". What is the
truth? Certainly, Forrester (Fly for your life) suggests that Bader was a long way behind
Tuck in seeing the merits of the German's "finger four" formation.
Indeed, Burns has Bader instructing his men, prior to and during Operation Dynamo, on the
niceties of attacking in vics of three and concentrating on formation aerobatics. If
Forrester is to be believed, Tuck abandoned such ideas within 24 hours.
Again, Burns speaks many times of Bader's delight in, illegal, low level aerobatics. Very
much the "fighter jock" image, but ignoring the fact that fighter jocks are
expensive to train and a finite resource - as we came close to finding to our cost in the
Battle of Britain.
For me, much of the difference between Bader and Tuck is summed up in the famous exchange
between the pair at Martlesham Heath (only a few miles down the road from here) on
40.05.28:
Bader: What's the form, old boy?
Tuck [Tired after several days of ops over Dunkirk; Bader had not yet
seen combat.]: Haven't a clue. We're all waiting to find out, aren't we.
[pause] It's all right - we know you're all bloody keen.
[Bader snorts and walks away.]
Tuck [Referring to Bader's silk scarf.]: By the way ... old boy ...
[implied sarcasm in both Forrester and Burns] I wouldn't fly with that
thing round your [sic] neck.
Bader: Why the hell [sic; Tuck said otherwise] shouldn't I?
Tuck: Because if you have to jump, it'll catch on something and you'll
hang your silly self, that's why.
On that same day, Bader led his squadron in vics of three, each covered
by a "weaver"; Tuck used the "finger four".
True, Bader abandoned such tactics a few days later, apparently at the suggestion of Al
Deere, but unlike Deere and Tuck he could not work it out for himself.
Finally, there is the question of the "Big Wing" theory. Personally, I think
that Bader was used by Leigh-Mallory in his feud with Park and Dowding. However, it must
be recognised that Bader's theories were developed from his position in 12 Group (N. of
the River Thames) and failed to take account of the much faster reaction times required by
11 Group (S. of Thames). Logically, 11 Group had to attack the incoming enemy while 12
Group's job was to protect 11 Group's airfields. This Bader's and Leigh-Mallory's strategy
signally failed to do. Luckily, the Germans switched their attention to London before the
Big Wing policy could do tooo much damage.
In some senses - and I'm sure I'll get some flack for this one - Bader and
Göring
were
different sides of the same coin: as Göring is alleged to have said: "Modern
aircraft contain boxes with coils and I don't like boxes with coils." (No one,
including Len Deighton and Alfred Price, has ever been able to give me a source for this
quotation; any offers?) My own - highly subjective - opinion is that Bader felt the same
way.
To sum up: IMHO, he was a moderate pilot, steeped in the ideas of 1918, and unable to
accept discipline. Burns also makes much of |Bader's experiences at Shell (1931-39),
saying that the experience taught him how to get his way with higher management.
Personally, I doubt this; as junior management, Bader would have been rigidly insulated
from higher management by those above him. Nothing against the chap personally, but I'd
rather have had Stanford Tuck as my wingman. (Or, OTOH, I would rather have been Tuck's
wingman. OK, I'm a bit pro Tuck, who, IMHO, never got the recognition he desrved; but,
OTOH, he did grow excellent mushrooms and in 1972(?3) I met him; I never met Bader. Tuck
had very good taste in both beer and whiskey. [Spelling deliberate.])